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Comment
AN UBERDILEMMA: EMPLOYEES AND INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
GRANT E. BROWN ∗
The sharing economy 1 is a growing industry brought on by the
omnipresence of the internet.2 With the click of a mouse, or the tap of a
finger, one can quickly offer or gain access to assets or services online.
Therefore, one of the distinguishing features of the sharing economy is the
ease of accessibility for producers and consumers. 3
Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) is one of most successful players in
the sharing economy. 4 Anyone with a car and some spare time to drive has
the option of offering his or herself through Uber as a transportation
resource to someone who wants a ride; Uber provides a medium (a mobile
app) through which these two parties can connect. 5 On the surface, Uber
drivers function like traditional taxi drivers. One major difference,

© 2016 Grant E. Brown.
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Marley Weiss for her guidance throughout the writing
process. The author would also like to thank the members of Maryland Law Review, especially
Colin Cloherty, Michael Cianfichi, Hannah Cole-Chu, Michael Collins, and Laura Merkey, for
taking the time to supply helpful feedback and edit this Comment. Finally, the author would like
to thank Uber for giving him something to write about and oftentimes helping him get to and from
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1. One definition of sharing economy is “[a]n economic model in which individuals are able
to borrow or rent assets owned by someone else.” Sharing Economy, INVESTOPEDIA
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sharing-economy.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
2. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharingeconomy (“[T]echnology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper and easier
than ever—and therefore possible on a much larger scale.”).
3. Thomas Claburn, The Sharing Economy: Access Is the New Ownership,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobiledevices/the-sharing-economy-access-is-the-new-ownership/d/d-id/1319946.
4. Cf. Douglas MacMillan & Telis Demos, Uber Valued at More Than $ 50 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (Jul. 31, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion1438367457 (“Uber Technologies, Inc. has completed a new round of funding that values the fiveyear-old ride-hailing company at close to $51 billion . . . .”).
5. Our Trip History, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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however, is that while traditional taxi drivers are generally considered to be
employees, 6 Uber asserts that its drivers are independent contractors. 7
The distinction between employees and independent contractors is
important for both Uber and its drivers because employees are entitled to
more statutory rights and protections than independent contractors.8 Uber
already faces mounting litigation from its drivers challenging their
independent contractor classifications. 9 With the growth of the sharing
economy, it is likely that litigation of this type will continue (if not
increase) for Uber and for other service providers with similar employment
arrangements. 10 This contentious issue is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
This Comment proposes a test for determining whether Uber drivers
are employees or independent contractors. Currently, different jurisdictions
and bodies of law apply various methods of distinguishing employees from
independent contractors, which in turn leads to inconsistent holdings. 11 In
an attempt to establish uniformity in this area of the law, this Comment
discerns consistent principles of employment relationships and considers
which are most applicable to participants in the sharing economy. 12 The
findings and recommendations in this Comment may extend to other
sharing economy participants; however, this Comment focuses solely on
Uber. Specifically, this Comment recommends that courts implement a
two-pronged test that queries 1) whether the worker can improve his or her
economic opportunity through managerial skills; and, 2) whether the
services provided by the worker are integral to the employer’s business.13
In applying this test to Uber, this Comment concludes that Uber drivers
6. See NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., Inc., 512 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
Friendly’s taxicab drivers were employees); but see Ademovic v. Taxi USA, LLC, 767 S.E.2d
571, 579 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that taxi driver for Taxi USA, LLC was an independent
contractor).
7. RASIER, LLC, Software License and Online Services Agreement, at § 13.1 (2014),
https://uber-regulatorydocuments.s3.amazonaws.com/country/united_states/p2p/Partner%20Agreement%20November%
2010%202014.pdf (“[T]he relationship between the parties under this Agreement is solely that of
independent contractors.”) [hereinafter RASIER, LLC, Agreement]. Rasier is a “subsidiary of Uber
Technologies, Inc.” Id. at *1.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. Jacob Demmitt, Uber Sued by Former Worker Seeking at Least $44M on Behalf of All
(Nov.
20,
2015),
Washington
State
Uber
Drivers,
GEEKWIRE
http://www.geekwire.com/2015/uber-hit-with-another-lawsuit-over-driver-classification-this-timein-washington-state/.
10. James B. Shrimp, Uber and the Heightened Scrutiny of Independent Contractor Status,
INTELLIGENCER
(Sept.
30,
2015),
LEGAL
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202738521960/Uber-and-the-Heightened-Scrutiny-ofIndependent-Contractor-Status?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=2 (“Employment lawsuits have
been the primary threat against [sharing economy] businesses . . . .”).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.C.

2016]

AN UBERDILEMMA

17

should be classified as employees because they cannot use managerial skills
to make more money and Uber drivers supply a service integral to Uber’s
business. 14
I. BACKGROUND
Courts and administrative agencies have reached contrary holdings
concerning Uber drivers’ status as employees or independent contractors. 15
One reason for the inconsistent driver classification is the various number
of tests that courts use to determine whether an Uber driver is an
independent contractor or an employee. 16 These inconsistent tests are a
result of the many different bodies of employment law. 17 Despite multiple
cases under assorted bodies of law, the facts for each case concerning Uber
are consistent because a similar contract is signed by each Uber driver
before he or she begins working. 18
This Section will examine the relationship between Uber and its
drivers, survey some of the tests used to distinguish between employees and
independent contractors, and assess how the tests are applied in the context
of Uber by courts and administrative agencies in order to illuminate a
method that accurately determines whether an Uber driver is an employee
or an independent contractor. 19 Part I.A will delve into the relationships
between Uber, its drivers, and its customers. 20 Specifically, Part I.A.1
explores how Uber drivers come to work for Uber; 21 whereas, Part I.A.2
looks into how Uber represents itself and its drivers to customers. 22 Part I.B
will then focus on some of the many tests used to distinguish employees
from independent contractors. 23 This Section does not contain an
exhaustive review of all the relevant tests, but rather explores some
variations of the two main employee/independent contractor tests: the rightto-control test 24 and the economic realities test.25 Finally, Part I.C delves
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. Compare Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *10
(Cal. Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015) (finding that Uber drivers are employees), with Rasier, LLC v. Fla.
Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *7 (Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity Sept.
30, 2015) (finding that Uber drivers are independent contractors).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. For example, on the federal level there are the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169 (2015), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2015). States also
implement their own employment law.
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See Part I.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.A.2
22. See infra Part I.A.2.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part I.B.1.
25. See infra Part I.B.2.
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into two rulings that have already determined an Uber driver’s
classification. 26 Part I.C.1 discusses one California ruling that held that
Uber drivers are employees under the California Labor Code.27
Conversely, Part I.C.2 analyzes one case in which a Florida agency held
that Uber drivers were independent contractors. 28
A. Uber’s Relationships with Its Drivers and Its Customers
Before determining what it means to be an employee or independent
contractor, it is first important to set forth the facts currently defining the
relationship between Uber and its drivers. This Part will therefore examine
1) Uber’s relationship with its drivers and 2) how Uber holds itself and its
drivers out to its customers. The Uber/driver relationship is important to
examine because the nature of that relationship determines whether an Uber
driver’s agreement resembles that of an employee contract or an
independent contractor contract. Uber’s relationship with its customers is
also an important consideration because one major factor in determining
whether an employment relationship exists is whether the purported
employee furthers the employer’s business objective. 29 The relationship
between Uber and its customers will clarify whether Uber drivers further
Uber’s business objective.
1. Uber’s Relationship with Its Drivers
Prospective Uber drivers must undergo a thorough application
process. 30 This process includes having applicants “upload their driver’s
license information [and] information about their vehicle’s registration and
insurance,” pass both a third-party background check and “city knowledge
test,” and interview with an Uber employee. 31 After the prospective driver
successfully completes the application, he or she “must sign contracts with
Uber or one of Uber’s subsidiaries.” 32
The contract signed between the driver and Uber or its subsidiary,
Rasier, LLC, (hereinafter collectively “Uber”) is called the “Software
License and Online Services Agreement” (hereinafter “Driver Contract”). 33
Uber explains in the Driver Contract that it merely allows the driver to have
access to Uber services through which the driver can provide transportation

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.C.2.
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id.
RASIER LLC, Agreement, supra note 7, at *1.
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services to Uber users. 34 In light of this working model, Uber describes
itself as a provider of “peer-to-peer . . . passenger transportation services.” 35
The company, nevertheless, seemingly wants to avoid being classified as a
transportation company as indicated by the first page of the Driver
Contract. 36
Regardless of whether Uber is a transportation or technology
company, the Driver Contract stipulates certain provisions with which
drivers must comply in order for the Driver Contract to continue.37 For
example, drivers are required to complete at least one ride per month and
are prohibited from allowing third parties to drive with the driver’s Uber
ID. 38 Uber drivers must also “provide all necessary equipment, tools and
other materials, at [their] own expense,” 39 and make sure that their vehicle
complies with Uber’s vehicle requirements set forth in Section 3.2 of the
agreement. 40 Even though drivers must supply their own equipment, Uber
agrees to provide them with the mobile application through which drivers
access transportation requests. 41 Drivers are further required to maintain a
minimum average rating, 42 in order to continue under the Driver Contract.43
Uber maintains that it does not “direct or control [the driver] generally
or in [his or her] performance under [the Driver Contract].”44 The driver,
for example, may terminate the Driver Contract whenever he or she
wishes. 45 The driver is also not required to wear a uniform or any type of
other Uber insignia. 46 Finally, the driver is free to “engage in any other
34. Id. (“The Uber services enable an authorized transportation provider to seek, receive and
fulfill requests for transportation services from an authorized user of Uber’s mobile
applications.”).
35. Id.; see also id. at § 1.13.
36. Id. at *1 (stating “[y]ou acknowledge and agree that [Uber] is a technology services
provider that does not provide transportation services” in boldface type).
37. Id. at § 2.1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at § 2.2.
40. Id. at § 3.2. This Section, concerning vehicle requirements, requires drivers to have a
vehicle that is 1) properly registered; 2) owned by the driver or in his lawful possession; 3)
suitable to perform transportation services; and 4) in good operating condition. Id.
41. Id. at § 2.6. Drivers access the mobile app through their own devices, or Uber will
provide drivers with such a device. Regardless of which device drivers use, they are responsible
for payments on the device. Without this app, drivers would be unable to drive for Uber because
the app is the only way to reach Uber customers.
42. Id. at § 2.5.1. Uber users are prompted to rate their driver on the mobile app after their
ride has been provided. Id. The rating scale is set from one to five stars, with five being the best
possible
rating.
How
to
Get
a
5-Star
Rating?,
UBER MELBOURNE,
https://drive.uber.com/melbourne/how-can-we-help/how-to-uber/vicquality/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2016).
43. Id. at § 2.5.2.
44. Id. at § 2.4.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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occupation or business,” including “us[ing] other software application
services in addition to the Uber Services.” 47
While Uber asserts that it does not exert control over its drivers, Uber
retains the right to control the calculation of the fare that the driver receives
for his or her services. 48 In addition, Uber reserves the right to alter the way
that it calculates fares, adjust or cancel any fares that have already occurred,
and take a service fee from each fare for itself, the amount of which
depends upon the territory. 49 Under the Driver Contract, drivers are not
entitled to additional amounts, nor are they allowed to negotiate their fares,
unless they are negotiating to receive a lower fare. 50
Finally, Uber, both through the Driver Contract and through job
advertisements, asserts that the relationship between it and the driver is that
of an independent contractor. 51 Section 13.1 of the Driver Contract states in
pertinent part, “Except as otherwise provided herein . . . , the relationship
between the parties under this Agreement is solely that of independent
contractors. The parties expressly agree that . . . this Agreement is not an
employment agreement . . . .” 52 Job advertisements promulgated by Uber
also emphasize that Uber considers its drivers to be independent
contractors. For example, on Uber’s website, the company states, “[d]rive
with Uber and earn great money as an independent contractor,” “[a]s an
independent contractor with Uber, you have the freedom and flexibility to
drive whenever you have time,” and “[b]e your own boss and get paid in
fares for driving on your own schedule.” 53 In addition to explicitly
mentioning the independent contractor relationship, these advertisements
stress the high level of autonomy belonging to Uber drivers.54
2. Uber’s Relationship with Its Customers and the Public
A prominent factor used in classifying a person as an employee or an
independent contractor is whether the purported employee’s service
advances the business objective of the employer. 55 Looking at the actions,
advertisements, and user agreements that Uber directs towards its customers
therefore helps to uncover Uber’s actual business model.

47. Id.
48. Id. at § 4.1 (explaining that the drivers have a right to receive fares, but that their fares
will be set by Uber’s “Fare Calculation”).
49. Id. at §§ 4.2–4.4.
50. Id. at §§ 4.1, 4.7.
51. Id. at § 13.1; see also Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
52. RASIER, LLC, Agreement, supra note 7, at § 13.1.
53. Uber Needs Partners Like You, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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There is a disagreement regarding Uber’s status as a technology
company. 56 Skeptical courts argue that Uber disseminates advertisements
that suggest the company provides transportation services. 57 One page on
Uber’s website, for example, states, “Your ride, on demand.” 58
Additionally, through its advertisements, Uber likens its services to that of a
taxi company, thereby insinuating that it is in the business of providing
transportation services. 59
The UberBlack service, which provides
customers with high-end sedans, also holds itself out as “your own private
driver.” 60
On the other hand, language from Uber advertisements and user
agreements depict Uber as a technology company. 61 In a job description,
for example, Uber says, “Uber is evolving the way the world moves. By
seamlessly connecting riders to drivers through our apps, we make cities
more accessible . . . .” 62 Furthermore, Uber requires that its users agree to
terms in a user agreement that provide in pertinent part, “YOU
ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT
UBER
DOES
NOT
PROVIDE
TRANSPORTATION OR LOGISTICS SERVICES OR FUNCTION AS A
TRANSPORTATION CARRIER.” 63
Nevertheless, some courts and administrative agencies have found that
Uber is a transportation company despite its assertions that it is exclusively
a technological company. 64 In Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 65
California’s Labor Commissioner found that Uber was more than a
technological company even though the company represents itself as a
technological platform in its user agreement.66
Central to the

56. Id. at 1137–38.
57. Id. at 1141 (“Uber’s self-definition as a mere ‘technology company’ focuses exclusively
on the mechanics of its platform. . . . This is an unduly narrow frame.”).
58. Uber Moves Washington D.C., UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/washington-DC (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016).
59. Start Riding with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Feb. 4, 2016)
(“Everyday rides that are always smarter than a taxi.”).
60. Kate Donahue, Utah, Your UberBLACK Is Arriving Now!, UBER (July 30, 2015),
https://newsroom.uber.com/us-utah/utah-uberblack/.
61. Our Trip History, supra note 5; see also Legal: Terms and Conditions, UBER (Jan. 2,
2016), https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms.
62. Regional Email Marketing Manager, UBER, https://www.uber.com/careers/list/15276
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
63. Legal: Terms and Conditions, supra note 61. The agreement also provides that “The
Services constitute a technological platform.” Id.
64. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *9 (CA. Dept.
Lab. June 3, 2015).
65. Id.
66. Id. (“Defendants hold themselves out as nothing more than a neutral technological
platform, designed simply to enable drivers and passengers to transact the business of
transportation. The reality, however, is that defendants are involved in every aspect of the
operation.”).
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Commissioner’s ruling was that Uber exerted substantial control over the
transportation side of the business.67 The Commissioner also found that the
drivers were an integral part to Uber’s business of “provid[ing]
transportation services to passengers” because the drivers “did the actual
transporting of those passengers.” 68
Uber has also applied for transportation network company (“TNC”)
status in some states. 69 In California, a TNC is “an organization . . . that
provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an
online-enabled application or platform to connect passengers with drivers
using a personal vehicle.” 70 Many other states use a similar definition for
TNC. 71 In some states, like Nebraska, organizations must first obtain a
permit in order to operate as a TNC. 72 Uber now lawfully operates as a
TNC in Nebraska because the Nebraska Public Service Commission
approved Uber’s application in 2015. 73 Even though Uber argues that it is
in the business of technological services, its status as a TNC suggests that it
operates, at least in part, as a transportation provider.74
B. There Are a Variety of Tests to Determine Whether a Person Is an
Employee or an Independent Contractor
The two most prominent tests used to classify a worker as an employee
or independent contractor are the right-to-control test and the economic
realities test. 75 Part I.B.1 of this Section surveys the variations of the rightto-control test 76 and Part I.B.2. lays out the economic realities test.77
67. Id. Uber vetted its drivers, controlled the tools used by the drivers, monitored driver
ratings, and set the price for transportation. Id.
68. Id. at *8.
69. In re Rasier, LLC, 2015 WL 4512882, at *1 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 21, 2015).
70. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE. § 5431(a) (West 2015).
71. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 65-15-301(4) (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-51102 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3942.01 (West 2016).
72. NEB. REV. STAT. § 75-324(1) (West 2015).
73. In re Rasier, supra note 69, at *2.
74. This argument echoes the court’s thought in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., that:
Uber is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, [or] John Deere is technology company
because it uses computers and robots to manufacture lawn mowers . . . . Indeed very
few (if any) firms are not technology companies . . . .
82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
75. Cajas Commercial Interiors v. Torres-Lizama, 316 P.3d 389, 394 (Or. Ct. App. 2013)
(“In some cases, we have indicated that the economic realities test applies, and in others we have
indicated that the right-to-control test applies. . . . [T]he two tests are intended to capture different
groups of relationships.”). There are, however, other tests for determining whether a person is an
employee or an independent contractor, such as the IRS 20-factor test. Also, note that while a
certain test may apply in the context of a specific statute (for example, courts use the economic
realities test for Fair Labor Standards Act claims and other social welfare legislation), both the
right-to-control test and the economic realities test are judge-made law.
76. See infra Part I.B.1.
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1. The Right-to-Control Test
There are many variations of the right-to-control test, including the
right to control, necessary control, and entrepreneurial opportunities tests.
These variations of the right-to-control test are not exhaustive, but they do
provide a survey of the ways different courts determine the right to control
and how they apply to employment relationships.
The first variation of the right-to-control test examines the right of the
purported employer to control the purported employee. 78 In Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 79 the United States Supreme Court adopted
the approach set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section
220(1), which defines an employee 80 as one who is “employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control
or right to control.” 81 The Reid Court explained that the right-to-control
employment test does not necessarily equate to actual control because there
are scenarios in which independent contractors may be subject to actual
control; this, however, does not mean that they are employees.82
The Restatement (Second) of Agency enumerates ten non-exhaustive
factors 83 that courts may consider when determining whether the purported
employer maintains the right-to-control the worker. 84 In Walker v. United

77. See infra Part I.B.2.
78. The U.S. Supreme Court employed this variation of the right-to-control test in Clackamas
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells. 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (“At common law the
relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship focus on the master’s control over the
servant.”). This Comment refers to this variation of the right-to-control test, somewhat
confusingly, as the right-to-control test.
79. 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
80. The Restatement (Second) of Agency does not use the terms “employer” and “employee,”
but rather uses the broader terms “master” and “servant.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958).
81. Id. § 220(1). Physical control “does not exclusively connote . . . rendering manual labor,
but [rather] perform[ing] continuous service for another and who, as to his physical movements, is
subject to control or the right to control of the other as to the manner of performing the service.”
Id. § 220(1) cmt. a.
82. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958). These factors
include:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employee is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the
employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the
work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties
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States, 85 for example, the court found an employment relationship in which
SAIC, the purported employer, exercised a great amount of control when it
demanded that the instructor employees teach only the SAIC curriculum. 86
The court also considered further factors, such as the fact that the
instructors provided services integral to SAIC’s business and that they were
paid by teaching jobs. 87
A second variation of the right-to-control test is called the necessary
control test. 88 This test is more probing than the right-to-control test
because it examines whether the employer retains control over the
employee’s performance of the employer’s necessary business operations,
as opposed to control over the employee’s performance in general. 89 Courts
developed the necessary control test in order to prevent employers from
divesting themselves of control that is irrelevant to the employer’s business
in an attempt to assert that their diminished control means their workers are
independent contractors. 90 For example, in S.G. Borello & Sons v.
Department of Industrial Relations, 91 the court determined that workers
who harvested vegetables did not require persistent control because “the
simplicity of the work . . . makes detailed supervision and discipline
unnecessary.” 92 Nevertheless, the lack of unnecessary control did not
preclude the court from finding an employment relationship because the
employer still maintained “meaningful” control over the business.93 Similar
to the right-to-control test, the necessary control test allows courts to assess
a variety of factors when distinguishing employees from independent
contractors. 94
believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant; and (j) whether the
principal is or is not in business.
Id. (quoting Moberly v. Day, 757 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. 2001)).
85. 758 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
86. Id. at 762. Note that the court uses the term “exercise[s]” which seems to relate more to
actual control (actual control means that employer is in the process of controlling the employee;
right to control only means that the employer may control the employee, even though the
employer might not do so). Id. This does not, however, mean that they are not applying the rightto-control test. The employer may, after all, exercise the control that he has the right to exercise.
87. Id. at 761.
88. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“California courts have since applied Borello’s ‘all necessary control’ test . . . .”).
89. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989).
90. Id. (“A business entity may not avoid its statutory obligations by carving up its
production process into minute steps, then asserting that it lacks ‘control’ over the exact means by
which one such step is performed by the responsible workers.”).
91. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
92. Id. at 408.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 404 (“[A]dditional factors have been derived principally from the Restatement
Second of Agency. These include (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c)
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The third variation of the right-to-control test is the entrepreneurial
opportunities test. 95 This test looks at how much control employers have by
examining the extent and the type of control employees have. 96
Specifically, the entrepreneurial opportunities test asks “whether the
putative independent contractors have a ‘significant entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss.’” 97 Factors that courts consider when looking
at entrepreneurial opportunity include (but are not limited to) ownership of
equipment, ability to hire employees, and inapplicability of the purported
employer’s discipline system. 98 The entrepreneurial opportunity test still
considers the other common law factors that courts use to distinguish
employees from independent contractors,99 though it aims to make the
employment determination less arbitrary. 100 In FedEx Home Delivery v.
NLRB, 101 the D.C. Circuit relied on the entrepreneurial opportunities test to
hold that FedEx drivers were independent contractors despite the fact that
the FedEx drivers were required to wear uniforms, drive a specific vehicle,
and complete a driving course.102 The court reached its conclusion because
the drivers could meaningfully effect their entrepreneurial ability by
purchasing and selling routes, managing routes by hiring employees, and
even incorporating. 103

the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time
for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by
the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h)
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.”).
95. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing
the evolution of the right-to-control test and the complications concerning the definition of
control).
96. Cf. id. at 497 (citing Corp. Express Delivery Sys. V. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“An important animating principle by which to evaluate [employment] factors in cases
where some factors cut one way and some the other is whether the position presents the
opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”).
When an employee controls
entrepreneurial opportunities, it is because the employer no longer wields the control over that
aspect of the work.
97. Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780 (quoting In re Corp. Express Delivery Sys.,
332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 1522 (2000)).
98. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498 (citing Ariz. Republic, 349 NLRB 1040, 1040–
41, 46 (2007)). Note also that entrepreneurial opportunity does not merely encompass actual
opportunity, the test looks for potential opportunity as well. Ariz. Republic, 349 NLRB at 1045.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958).
100. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (“[W]hile all the considerations at common law
remain in play, an important animating principle by which to evaluate those factors in cases where
some factors cut one way and some the other is whether the position presents the opportunities
and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism. Although using this ‘emphasis’ does not make applying
the test purely mechanical, the line drawing is easier . . . .”).
101. 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 500–01.
103. Id. at 504.
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2. The Economic Realities Test
As demonstrated by the various forms of the right-to-control test, there
is not one definitive test that courts use to determine whether an
employment relationship exists.104 Different bodies of law may also require
different thresholds of classification for employees and independent
contractors. 105 Courts resolving cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), for example, apply the economic realities test to determine
whether a worker should be classified as an employee or an independent
contractor. 106
The economic realities test depends “ultimately, [on] whether, as a
matter of economic reality, the individuals ‘are dependent upon the business
to which they render service.’” 107 When coming to its conclusion, courts
consider the following the six factors, none of which are alone dispositive:
1) the degree of employer’s right-to-control the manner in which work is to
be performed; 2) the worker’s economic opportunity for profit and loss
depending on managerial skill; 3) the worker’s investment in his
equipment/materials required for the task and his ability to hire help; 4)
whether the worker utilizes a special skill; 5) the degree of employment
permanence; and 6) whether the service rendered is integral to the
employer’s business. 108
The economic realities test was developed to expand the coverage of
remedial legislation to employees who likely would have been defined as
independent contractors under the more stringent right-to-control test. 109
For example, in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 110 an early Supreme
Court decision applying the FLSA, the Court held that beef deboners were
employees of the slaughterhouse where they worked. 111 Central to the
Court’s holding is the notion that the FLSA codified a broader definition of
“employee.” 112 The Court therefore upheld the Circuit Court’s ruling even
though, like independent contractors, the deboners supplied their own tools
and got paid commensurate with the amount of meat they deboned. 113

104. See supra Part I.B.1.
105. Cf. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The Fair
Labor Standards Act has the broadest definition of ‘employee.’”).
106. Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)).
108. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. Barfield v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008).
110. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
111. Id. at 730–31.
112. Id. at 729 (“This Act contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its
application to many persons and working relationships which, prior to this Act, were not deemed
to fall within an employer-employee category.” (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330
U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947))).
113. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 725, 727, 730.
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C. Courts and Agencies Reach Conflicting Holdings When
Determining Whether Uber Drivers Are Employees or Independent
Contractors
Courts and agencies have reached inconsistent holdings regarding the
classification of Uber drivers as employees or independent contractors. 114
This Part looks at two of these opposing decisions. Part I.C.1 discusses
Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 115 in which the California Labor
Commission found that Uber drivers were employees, and Part I.C.2
discusses Rasier, LLC v. Department of Economic Opportunity, 116 in which
a Florida state agency determined the Uber driver was classified as an
independent contractor.
1. Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
Barbara Ann Berwick entered into a Driver Contract with the
defendant, Uber, which set out her duties as a driver for the company. 117
Included in the agreement was a description of Uber’s expected driver
procedures. 118 For example, the driver was under no obligation to accept a
job request from a customer, but once she did, she was required to follow
through with the ride. 119 The driver had to supply her own car and was
responsible for its maintenance, including ensuring that the car met Uber’s
minimum requirements. 120 Uber retained very little control over the hours
that the driver worked; the only stipulation required that if the driver was
not active for 180 days, her account would be deactivated.121 Uber also
retained the right to terminate the agreement with Berwick. 122
In deciding the case, the Berwick Commissioner followed California
precedent. 123 Under California law, workers establish a prima facie case
that an employment relationship exists when the worker provides a service
for the employer. 124 To assist this determination, the court is to consider the

114. Compare Part I.C.1 infra, with Part I.C.2 infra.
115. No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765 (CA. Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015).
116. No. 0026 2825 90-02 (Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity Sept. 30, 2015).
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id. at *2–4. Also note that the Berwick driving agreement is similar, if not identical, to
the driver agreement discussed in Part I.A.1 of this Comment. See supra Part I.A.1.
119. Id. at *2 (“You shall be entitled to accept, reject, and select among the Requests received
via the Service.”).
120. Id. at *3 (“You agree that you shall maintain a vehicle that is a model approved by
[Uber]. Any such vehicle shall be no more than ten (10) model years old . . . .”).
121. Id. at *5.
122. Id. at *9. (“Defendants monitor the Transportation Drivers’ approval ratings and
terminate their access to the application if the rating falls below a specific level (4.6 stars).”).
123. Id. at *6.
124. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing
Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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following factors (referred to as the Borello factors): whether 1) the worker
engages in same type of occupation as the principal; 2) the work is part of
principal’s normal business; 3) the principal supplies the equipment; 4) the
worker provides equipment because he is required to or for his own
employees; 5) a special skill is required; 6) the nature of the work,
especially in the context of how it is conducted in the locality; 7) the
worker’s profit is correlated to his managerial skill; 8) the work will be
finished quickly or not; 9) the working relationship is permanent; 10) the
payment is by time or job; and 11) whether the parties believe they are in an
employee-employer relationship. 125 However, the paramount consideration
is whether the employer retains “all necessary control” over the worker.126
Uber argued that they were a neutral technological platform and, as
such, they retained very little to no control over Berwick. 127 The
Commissioner, however, found otherwise. 128
Specifically, the
Commissioner ruled that Uber was “involved in every aspect of the
operation.” 129 Uber controlled the tools the drivers used, such as the
smartphone application, and required that the drivers register a car of a
certain standard. 130 Drivers were also limited in their entrepreneurial ability
because Uber prohibited them from setting their own fares and they could
not hire other drivers who Uber did not already approve. 131 In light of the
aforementioned facts, the Commissioner found that Berwick, as a driver,
was an employee of Uber because she performed a service for the company
and Uber maintained all necessary control over her.132
2. Rasier, LLC v. Florida Department of Economic Opportunity
Rasier, LLC v. Florida Department of Economic Opportunity
contained a fact pattern similar to that of Berwick, but reached a different
holding. 133 In Rasier, the Department of Economic Opportunity, a Florida
agency, took this case on appeal after the Department of Revenue
determined that Darren McGillis was an employee of Uber. 134 McGillis

125. Berwick, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6–7 (citing S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989)).
126. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (citing Borello, 769 P.2d at 404).
127. Berwick, 2015 WL 4153765, at *8.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *9. (“Defendants vet prospective drivers, who must provide to Defendants their
personal banking and residence information, as well as their Social Security Number. Drivers
[must also] pass Defendants’ background and DMV checks.”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *10.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *1, *4.

2016]

AN UBERDILEMMA

29

signed a Driver Contract similar to the one in contention in Berwick. 135
Nevertheless, the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity found that
McGillis and other Uber drivers were independent contractors.136 The
agency relied on Florida precedent, which uses the right to control test from
Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 137 In determining
whether a purported employer maintains the right to control the worker,
Florida considers the following factors: 1) the business’s extent of control
over the details of the work; 2) whether the worker is engaged in a distinct
business; 3) the kind of occupation; 4) the skill required for the work; 5)
whether the worker supplies his/her own tools; 6) the length of
employment; 7) whether payment is by time or job; 8) whether the work is
part of the employer’s regular business; 9) what the parties believed they
were creating; and 10) whether the principal is or is not in the business.138
Before engaging in an analysis of the employment relationship, the
agency suggested that control is the most important consideration for
determining whether an employment relationship exists. 139 In light of this,
the agency determined that Uber exerts little control over the driver. 140
Specifically, the agency relied on the driver’s discretion to pick the route
that he takes on his trips and stated that the driver engages in an
“entrepreneurial decision making process” by selecting which rides to take.
Furthermore, the agency found that the background checks and instructional
videos that Uber requires its drivers to take part in essentially equates to de
minimis control. 141 The agency also placed great emphasis on the
contractual intent of the parties,142 and the Uber contract, which stated that
the driver was an independent contractor.143 Taking all of these facts into
consideration, the agency concluded that the relationship between Uber and
its drivers was that of an independent contractor, and recommended that the
determination of the Department of Revenue be reversed. 144

135. See supra Part I.A.1.
136. Rasier, LLC, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *7.
137. Id. at *5 (citing Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1966)).
138. Rasier, LLC, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220(2)(a–j) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958)).
139. Rasier, LLC, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *5 (“The relationship of the employer-employee
requires control and direction by the employer over the actual conduct of the employee. This
exercise of control . . . is the feature that distinguishes an independent contractor from a servant.”
(citing Collins v. Federated Mut. Implement and Hardware Ins. Co., 247 So.2d 461, 463–64 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971))).
140. Rasier, LLC, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *6.
141. Id. at *6.
142. Id. at *5 (quoting Keith v. News and Sun-Sentinel, Co., 667 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995)).
143. Rasier, LLC, NO. 0026 2825 90-02, at *6 (“There was an agreement with the Petitioner in
which the Drivers are designated as independent contractors.”).
144. Id. at *7.
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II. ANALYSIS
The variety of different tests that the courts use to distinguish between
employees and independent contractors has resulted in courts reaching
inconsistent classifications for Uber drivers.145 Even if the courts applied
the same test, different courts (even within the same jurisdiction) could
weigh factors differently, even arbitrarily, in similar cases.146 An elements
test, therefore, provides more consistency, which in turn offers fairness and
gives employers and employees clearer expectations.147
In order to develop an effective test, it is important first to lay out the
differences between employees and independent contractors and why the
classification is important. 148 Part II.A will compare and contrast
employees and independent contractors and explain the reasons for
providing employees with more statutory entitlements.149 This Part will
also will highlight important considerations that an effective employment
test should include. Part II.B will examine the sharing economy and its
impact on employment and assesses whether current tests effectively
classify sharing economy workers. 150 Finally, Part II.C will recommend a
two-pronged elements test in favor of the factors tests that courts have
utilized up to this point. 151 The first prong, discussed in Part II.C.1, will ask
whether workers can strengthen or weaken their economic position through
managerial skills.152 This Part suggests that Uber drivers do not have the
opportunity to meaningfully manage themselves to impact their income. 153
The second prong, discussed in Part II.C.2, will ask whether the worker
provides a service that is integral to the employer’s business.154 Because
Uber is in the business of providing transportation services, Uber drivers
provide a service that is integral to Uber’s business. 155 Lastly, Part II.C.3
will argue that the elements test is preferable to the factors test, and further,
145. See supra Part I.B–C.
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twentieth-First-Century: The “Independent Worker”, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, at 6 (2015)
(“The . . . ambiguity in these workers’ legal status leads to uncertainty and inefficiency in the
labor market that are harmful to both the workers and the intermediaries . . . .”).
148. This proves to be challenging, however, because even today workers and employers
struggle to distinguish the two. John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy:
A Rose Is Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 337, 337 (1991) (“Defining the nature of a
working relationship between suppliers of services and the parties to whom these services are
rendered is one of the most troublesome and important issues facing businesses today.”).
149. See infra Part II.A.
150. See infra Part II.B.
151. See infra Part II.C.
152. See infra Part II.C.1.
153. See infra Part II.C.1.
154. See infra Part II.C.2.
155. See infra Part II.C.2.

2016]

AN UBERDILEMMA

31

that some of the factors relied on by previous courts are less applicable in
the sharing economy. 156
A. The Employee/Independent Contractor Distinction
Congressional definitions of “employee” and “employer” are circular.
The FLSA, for example, defines an “employee” as “any individual
employed by an employer.” 157 The definition of “employer” as “any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee” 158 also offers no clarification of an employment relationship. 159
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) perhaps provides a clearer
definition of “employee” by saying what it is not: “The term ‘employee’
shall include any employee . . . but shall not include . . . any individual
having the status of an independent contractor . . . .” 160 It is clear that
employees are distinct from independent contractors; however, the NLRA’s
apophatic definition of “employee” does not help to distinguish one from
the other.
While it may be difficult to find a practical, working definition for
employee, it is easy to see that employees are entitled to statutory
protections that do not extend to independent contractors. 161 For example,
the purpose of the NLRA is to help remedy “[t]he inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association
or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership . . . .” 162 Guaranteeing collective
bargaining rights to employees, but not independent contractors, suggests
that employees are in a weaker bargaining position; they are more reliant on
their employment from a specific employer than are independent
contractors. 163

156. See infra Part II.C.3.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012).
158. Id. § 203(d).
159. The FLSA is not the exception. These seemingly obvious definitions are codified in
other federal statutes. See, e.g., American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
161. See, e.g., Patricia Davidson, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII:
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 203
(1984) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace, but that only those classified as “employees” could seek to
enforce the statute).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
163. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7 (“Independent contractors control the methods
and means of the work they perform for others, make significant capital investments, possibly
employ others, and retain the opportunity for profit or loss. For these reasons, independent
contractors are expected to have some bargaining power . . . .”).
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One characteristic of an employee is that they “work for wages or
salaries under direct supervision.” 164 This characteristic is consistent with
the notion that employees occupy dependent positions and sheds light on
why common law employment tests focus on control and economic
realities. 165 Statutory entitlements also require employers to make special
provisions for employees that are not necessary for independent
contractors. 166
Compared to employees, independent contractors function much more
autonomously. 167 Independent contractors “undertake to do a job for a
price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work,
and depend for their income not upon wages, but . . . upon profits.” 168 It
may seem obvious from the name, but independent contractors seem to
operate an entity that is entirely separate from the employers’. 169 This
distinction explains why common law employment tests ask whether the
worker provides a service that is integral to the employer’s business.170 An
independent contractor’s separation from the employer allows the
contractor to stand on his own and support himself by contracting his
services for jobs. Employees, however, are much more dependent upon
their employer because instead of services, they contract their labor.
It is difficult to give set definitions for employees and independent
contractors. 171 Nevertheless, some consistent principles regarding control
arise. The employment context involves an exchange in which the
164. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 322 (2001) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 80-245, at 3020 (1947)).
165. “Work for wages” relates to the economic realities test because the employees are fiscally
dependent on their employer, and “under direct supervisions” relates to the employer’s right to
control the employee. See infra Part II.B.
166. See Jane P. Kwak, Note, Employees Versus Independent Contractors: Why States Should
Not Enact Statutes That Target the Construction Industry, 39 J. LEGIS. 295, 295 (2012–13)
(“Classifying workers as independent contractors allows companies to avoid paying minimum
wage and overtime, the employer’s portion of the Social Security and Medicare taxes,
unemployment insurance taxes, worker’s compensation premiums, and circumvent federal
antidiscrimination laws.”).
167. Clement L. Hyland & Laura A. Quigley, Determination of Employee Status Right to
Control v. Economic Reality—Is There a Difference?, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1987, at 43, 43 (explaining
that independent contractors “perform services for another according to [their] own method and
manner”).
168. See Carlson, supra note 164, at 322 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 3020 (1947)).
169. Cf., Stolze v. Ark. Valley Elec. Co-op. Corp., 127 S.W.3d 466, 477 (Ark. 2003) (“The
doctrine of non-delegable duty if literally applied destroys the liability barrier between an owner
and an independent contractor, and for practical purposes treats the two separate entities as one
before the law.” (quoting Olson v. Kilstofte and Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D. Minn.
1971))).
170. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989).
171. Carlson, supra note 164, at 296 (“Employment laws by their very terms depend on the
identification of an employee and employment relationship. However, these laws are frequently
baffling in defining who is an ‘employee’ . . . .”).
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employee divulges control over a large portion of his or her work life,
which may include his or her economic future.172 In return, the employer
provides some economic security. 173
The employment relationship
typically extends indefinitely and the employer often gives the employee
instructions on how to complete the work. 174 Because the employer
maintains control over the employee, the employee usually has minimal
control over his or her work hours. 175
In contrast, independent contractors do not relinquish control over
their work life or their economic future. 176 Generally, contracts stipulate
specific limitations to an independent contractor’s otherwise vast ability to
dictate how the job is to be completed. 177 Furthermore, because contracts
usually dictate the nature of the relationship between the independent
contractor and the hiring party, it is common for an independent
contractor’s work to extend only for the duration of a specific job as
opposed to indefinitely. 178 Finally, independent contractors are generally
thought to operate on the periphery of the hiring party’s business, rather
than fulfilling an integral business operation.179
B. Employees in the Sharing Economy
The sharing economy gets its name from the notion that people with
underused assets share those assets with one another (for a price, of
course). 180 This allows people the ability to access assets and services
without having to actually own the product or the labor source.181 The
unprecedented growth of the sharing economy shows no signs of slowing
down. 182 The internet and technology spurred this growth by making

172. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel, 106 N.E. 365, 367 (Ind. 1914) (“An independent
contractor is one exercising an independent employment under a contract to do certain work by his
own methods, without subjection to the control of his employer, except as to the product or result
of the work.”).
177. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7.
178. Carlson, supra note 164, at 345.
179. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7.
180. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2 (“[T]he core of the sharing economy is
people renting things from one another.”).
181. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 4 (2012).
182. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES “THE SHARING
ECONOMY”
14
(2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwcconsumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf (“PwC’s projections show that five key
sharing sectors . . . have the potential to increase global revenues from roughly $15 billion today
to around $335 billion by 2025.”).
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sharing easier and accessible on a large scale, thereby reducing transaction
costs. 183
The sharing economy business model, however, has altered the typical
employer/employee relationship, particularly for those who use the sharing
economy to offer services.184 The new model complicates the distinction
between independent contractors and employees because “the emerging
sharing economy makes it easier to muddy classification categories [due to]
the heavy reliance on new technology.” 185 Uber, for example, asserts that it
is merely a technology company 186 that connects Uber consumers with
Uber drivers and therefore Uber drivers are not employees of Uber. 187
Despite these assertions, Uber acts like something other than a technology
service because the company vets its drivers and requires them to provide a
high level of service. 188 With this level of control over its drivers, Uber is
doing more than just connecting consumers with providers—it is mandating
driver compliance, meaning that the drivers operate on Uber’s terms instead
of their own.
Uber is nevertheless able to get away with classifying its drivers as
independent contractors in certain jurisdictions189 because the drivers
resemble independent contractors in some aspects and employees in
others. 190 For example, drivers provide their own cars and “can choose
when and whether to work, similar to independent contractors, but on the
other hand, drivers face restrictions that are imposed by the intermediary on
how much to charge customers.” 191 Similar to typical employment
relationships, Uber drivers also perform a service that is integral to Uber’s
business. 192
Recognizing that Uber drivers do not fall neatly into one category, the
Hamilton Project proposed modernizing labor and employment law by
183. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2; Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot,
What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, BOSTON. B.J. (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-sharingeconomy/.
184. Cf. Gillian B. White, In the Sharing Economy, No One’s an Employee, ATLANTIC (June
8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/in-the-sharing-economy-no-onesan-employee/395027/ (“[T]he emerging sharing economy makes it easier to muddy [employment]
classification categories . . . .”).
185. Id.
186. See supra Part I.A.2.
187. See supra Part I.A.1.
188. Id.; see also White, supra note 184 (claiming that Uber and Lyft are car services rather
than technology companies).
189. See, e.g., Rasier, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, No. 0026 2825 90-02 (Fla.
Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity Sept. 30, 2015).
190. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 5.
191. Id.
192. Cf. id. at 10 (“Lyft would not exist if no drivers were willing to provide car ride services
through the Lyft platform.”).
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creating a third category of worker: the independent worker.193 This
Comment does not argue for a third classification, rather, it argues for a
simplified employment test that can be applied with more consistency.
Nevertheless, the Hamilton Project’s reasoning for creating a new class
stresses the necessity of creating a simplified employment test. First,
companies could purposefully misclassify employees to avoid paying legal
benefits, which is detrimental to the worker and gives an unfair competitive
advantage to the employer. 194
Second, the ambiguity surrounding
classifications leads to uncertainty and legal battles.195
Finally,
employment laws are currently “not harmonized or applied consistently.”196
A simplified employment test that uses elements instead of factors helps to
resolve these three issues.
C. Courts Should Implement a Two-Prong Test to Classify Workers as
Employees or Independent Contractors
This Comment aims to create a workable two-pronged test that can be
applied to employment relationships in the sharing economy. Part II.C.1
discusses the first prong of this test and applies the test to Uber and its
drivers. 197 The first prong queries whether the worker has the ability to
improve his or her economic standing by exercising managerial skill. Part
II.C.1 argues that an Uber driver’s limited managerial skills prevents the
driver from bettering his economic situation, which is reminiscent of an
employment relationship.198 Part II.C.2 sets forth the second prong of the
test, which asks whether the worker provides a service that is integral to the
employer’s business. 199 Uber drivers also satisfy this prong of the test
because Uber provides a transportation service.200 Finally, Part II.C.3
explains why an elements test is preferable to the factor tests currently
applied by the courts. 201

193. Id. at 5. The Hamilton Project is an economic policy initiative at the Brookings
Institution. About THP, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/about/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2016).
194. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 5 (“[I]t is important that, if these new intermediaries
are to exceed and expand, it is a result of their superior technology, efficiency, or service, not
because their technology or business model enables regulatory arbitrage.”).
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id.
197. See infra Part.II.C.1.
198. See infra Part.II.C.1.
199. See infra Part II.C.2.
200. See infra Part II.C.2.
201. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Limited Ability to Improve Economic Opportunity Through
Managerial Skills Is Indicative of an Employment Relationship

The first prong of this Comment’s proposed test asks whether the
worker has a limited opportunity to impact his or her economic potential
through managerial skills. An affirmative answer to this question suggests
that the worker is an employee. This prong is an important determination
because it recognizes that economic autonomy is a vital feature in many
employment tests. 202 In the context of Uber, this prong is satisfied because
Uber drivers employ little to no managerial skills and therefore cannot
improve their economic condition through such skills.
Employment tests, such as the entrepreneurial opportunity test and
economic realities test, show that the courts are more likely to find that a
worker is an independent contractor when he has a high degree of economic
autonomy. 203 Courts that apply the entrepreneurial opportunities test focus
on whether “the putative independent contractors have a ‘significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss,’” which means that
independent contractors rely on themselves, as opposed to an employer, to
earn money. 204
In Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB, 205 the court noted
that control was an unwieldy factor, not always determinant of employment
status. 206 In reaching this conclusion, the Corporate Express court relied on
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 207 which states that “[i]n some types of
cases . . . the employer [may] not exercise control. Thus the full-time cook
is regarded as a servant although it is understood that the employer shall not
exercise control.” 208 Because control was not necessarily determinative of
an employment relationship, the court found that the entrepreneurial factor
was a better indicator of whether one was an independent contractor. 209
The ability to make money by “working smarter, not just harder,” therefore,
is a reliable method of determining whether an employment relationship
exists. 210

202. Recall the economic realities test, as well as the entrepreneurial opportunities variation of
the right-to-control test. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
203. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
204. Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re
Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 1527 (2000)).
205. 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
206. Id. at 780.
207. Id. Note that the text of the opinion cites to Section 202 of the Restatement, but this is
erroneous because the court actually discusses Section 220. Id.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1), cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
209. Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780. In addition to the cook example, the court
showed that the inverse may be true—that an independent contractor who runs his own lawn care
business may be subject to control and strict supervision from his or her clients. Id.
210. Id.
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The economic realities test also shows that economic autonomy is an
important consideration in the employment context. Legislation subject to
the economic realities test is generally remedial in nature.211 Social welfare
legislation receives this broader test because “it is important to compensate
or provide protection to those who look to their employer for financial
security and well-being.” 212 This belief that employees are dependent upon
their employers is encompassed in this prong because those who possess the
ability to directly affect their income through managerial skills do not rely
on their employers and function independently.
Finally, the use of managerial skills to improve economic opportunity
is inherent in other traditional factors that show a worker is an independent
contractor. 213 For example, one of the most prominent factors among all of
the employee/independent contractor tests assesses the extent to which the
employer can control the worker. 214 In the context of this prong, a worker’s
ability to use his or her managerial skills to improve his own economic
opportunity inversely affects an employer’s right to control that worker. In
other words, the more control a worker asserts over himself, the less control
an employer has over that worker.
Applying the first prong to the Uber context, Uber drivers cannot
improve their economic position through managerial skill. First, Uber
drivers have little economic autonomy because they can realistically only
work to make more money by working more hours. Moreover, because
they are unable to set their own fares, drivers are limited in services they
can offer to make rides more or less expensive. 215 Second, drivers
essentially lack any managerial skill because they are unable to hire drivers
to operate under their name. 216 Finally, being an Uber driver does not

211. See Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The [FLSA]
definition [of employee] is necessarily a broad one in accordance with the remedial purpose of the
Act.”).
212. Myra H. Barron, Who Is an Independent Contractor? Who Is an Employee?, 14 LAB.
LAW. 457, 460 (1999).
213. See, e.g., Linquist v. Hodges, 94 N.E. 94, 94 (Ill. 1911) (“One who contracts to do a
specific piece of work, furnishing his own assistants and executing the work either entirely in
accordance with his own ideas or in accordance with a plan previously given to him by the person
for whom the work is done, without being subject to the orders of the latter in respect to the details
of the work, is clearly a contractor, and not a servant.” (quoting Hale v. Johnson, 80 Ill. 185, 186
(1875)).
214. See supra Part I.B.1.
215. RASIER, LLC, Agreement, supra note 7, at § 4.1.
216. Substitution of labor is closely tied to managerial skills and is often indicative of an
independent contractor relationship. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 499
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding the drivers ability to hire other drivers strong evidence of an
employment relationship); see also Determining Who is an Employee, 16 No. 6 ANDREWS EMP’T
LITIG. REP. 3 (2001) (“Employees do not hire assistants to help them do their work for their
employer. Independent contractors can and often do hire their own assistants or employees to help
them in their work.”).
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require any special skill, let alone any managerial skill—one simply must
only be legally allowed to drive. Taking into consideration an Uber driver’s
inability to use managerial skills to improve his or her economic
opportunity, Uber drivers satisfy the first prong of the proposed test.
2. Services That Are Integral to the Employer’s Business Also
Suggests That an Employment Relationship Exists
The second prong of this proposed test inquires whether the worker
provides a service that is integral to the employer’s business. This prong is
a necessary component to an employment relations test because 1) it is a
factor in most factor tests (and normally it is given extra consideration)217
and 2) it highlights a key characteristic of the employment relationship: an
employee’s dependence on his employer. 218 Because Uber drivers provide
a service that is integral to Uber, they satisfy the second prong of this test.
The “integral to employer’s business” factor appears in the many
variations of the right-to-control test, 219 and the economic realities test. 220
In Borello, the court noted that “the modern tendency is to find employment
when the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the
employer.” 221 Additionally, in California, a finding that service has been
provided to an employer suffices on its own to establish a prima facie case
of employment. 222
The prominence of the “integral to employer’s business” factor,
however, stems from more than its popularity with the courts; rather, it
emphasizes a characteristic that is at the core of the employment
relationship, namely that employees do not operate an independent
business. 223 The “integral to employer’s business” prong encompasses the
spirit of other factors. Take, for example, “the length of time for which the
person is employed.” 224 Independent contractors usually operate for a set
amount of time to complete a certain job.225 Once this job is complete, an
independent contractor’s work is finished, yet the business for which he

217. See supra Part I.B.
218. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(h) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (right to
control); S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989)
(necessary control).
220. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]hether the
service rendered is an integral part of the of the alleged employer’s business.”).
221. 769 P.2d at 408–09 (citation omitted).
222. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[U]nder California law, once a
plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer, the employee
has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of employer/employee.”).
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(f) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
225. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 7.
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performed that work carries on. Compare this to employees who work
indefinitely. 226 Without this source of indefinite labor, employers would
likely be unable to function. Therefore, whether work is integral to the
employer’s business will be reflected in the duration of the employment. 227
Applying the second prong to the context of Uber, drivers perform a
service integral to Uber’s business. Uber would likely assert that it is a
neutral technology company like it does in its User Agreements 228 and past
litigation. 229 Central to Uber’s assertion is that it merely provides a
platform for consumers to connect with drivers, that they own no cars and
employs no drivers. 230
Despite these contentions, Uber is undoubtedly in the transportation
business. First, Uber’s business is specific. It does not connect all
consumers with all service providers, rather it only creates connections for
transportation. Second, in Uber’s advertisements the company represents
itself as a transportation company. 231 Finally, Uber is “deeply involved in
marketing its transportation services, qualifying and selecting drivers,
regulating and monitoring their performance, . . . and setting prices.” 232
Because Uber is more accurately defined as a transportation company, its
drivers perform a service that is integral to Uber’s business. Simply put,
Uber would not exist if it had no drivers. 233
3.

A Non-Exhaustive Factors Test May Lead to Inconsistent
Classifications and Some Factors Previously Relied on in
Employment Cases May Be Inapplicable in the Sharing
Economy

Imprecise tests are common in law, 234 but “we accept such uncertainty
as the price of a system that permits treating each case as unique.”235 This
does not mean, however, that uncertainty is preferable when the option for
certainty exists.236 In fact, the current “flexible” standard for employee

226. Id.
227. A similar argument could be made for the “method of payment” factor. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
228. Legal, supra note 61.
229. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
230. Id.
231. Id. (“Uber has previously referred to itself as an ‘On-Demand Car Service,’ and goes by
the tagline ‘Everyone’s Private Driver.’”).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1142 (“Uber . . . would not be a viable business entity without its drivers.”).
234. The “reasonable person” standard in a negligence cause of action, for example, cannot be
reduced to an equation.
235. See Carlson, supra note 164, at 336.
236. Id. (arguing that there are two objections to the notion that classification uncertainty is
workable: 1) there are usually tests available that would suit the legislative purpose of a given

40

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 75:15

classification means that businesses may struggle to correctly classify its
workers, and may suffer expensive penalties as a result. 237 For example, an
employer who classifies its workers as independent contractors by relying
on contractual intent and the fact that the worker supplies his own tools will
be sorely disappointed when the court makes its decision relying on other
factors, such as control over worker appearance and the level of skill
required for the job. 238
Moreover, the factors test applied to the employment relationship is
subject to abuse because “[a] fact found controlling in one combination may
have a minor importance in another.” 239 The reality is that “too many case
conclusions are driven by a predetermined desired outcome rather than by
objective analysis.” 240 The result is that similarly situated workers are
classified differently, not because of different facts, but because of different
jurisdictions and opinions. 241 This Comment, for example, examined two
Uber cases in which state agencies classified drivers with similar operating
agreements differently. 242 California’s Labor Commissioner and Florida’s
Department of Economic Opportunity even applied a common law right-tocontrol test (albeit, they did apply different variations). 243 In Berwick, the
Commissioner used the necessary control test to find that Uber exerted
necessary control over the drivers by setting fares, restricting their ability to
hire others, and requiring drivers to register their cars. 244 Conversely, in
Rasier, the Florida agency applying the right-to-control test found that Uber
exerted little control because the drivers retained the ability to choose which
route to drive and they could select their own hours. 245 The latter’s analysis
offers a very stringent interpretation of control emphasizing petty aspects of

statute and offer more clarity, and 2) legal uncertainty encourages employers to misclassify their
employees and test the limits of the law).
237. Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a Workable Legal Standard for Defining an
Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 93 (2010).
238. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, 765 F.3d 981, 989–91 (9th Cir.
2014) (showing that an operating agreement labeling the relationship as an independent contractor
relationship and the workers’ ability to hire employees to complete driving routes was not
dispositive of an independent contractor relationship because FedEx still maintained substantial
control over how the business operated).
239. Harger v. Structural Servs. Inc., 916 P.2d 1324, 1334 (N.M. 1996); see also Richardson
v. APAC-Miss., Inc., 631 So. 2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994). (“[T]he various tests to determine the
type of relationship are themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently, depending
upon which judge is applying them.”).
240. Harris & Krueger, supra note 147, at 6.
241. Id.
242. See supra Part I.C.
243. See supra Part I.C.
244. Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765 at *9 (Cal.
Dept. Lab. 2015).
245. Raiser, LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, No. 0026 2825 90-02, at *6 (Fla. Dep’t
of Econ. Opportunity Sept. 30, 2015).
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a driver’s job and most likely reflects the judge’s opinion rather than the
reality.
Employment relationships are changing from their traditional 9-to-5,
in-office workday, and therefore employer-employee relationships look
unlike those of the past. 246 The changing face of employment relationships
means that companies more often struggle to correctly classify
employees. 247 Innovation and technology provoke this confusion because
“the more innovative a company is, the more likely it is to use nontraditional forms of employment.” 248 The sharing economy (with its
indisputable connection to technology), therefore, finds itself enmeshed
with non-traditional employment. 249
Narrowing the factor tests down to a two-pronged elements test allows
courts to accurately define an employment relationship without letting the
workers fall victim to the realities of non-traditional employment. For
example, one common factor relied on by courts, “whether the employer or
the workman supplies the instruments,” 250 may be less indicative of an
independent contractor relationship today because many people that use
their personal laptops and smartphones for work should still be classified as
employees. Another common factor states that whereas “[e]mployees work
pursuant to a schedule set by the employer[,] [i]ndependent contractors
generally set their own hours.” 251 In the context of Uber, Uber exerts a lot
of control over the driver while he or she is on the clock. 252 It seems
superficial, if not unfair, to say a driver’s ability to select his or her own
hours overrides more other, apparent forms of control, like vetting the
driver and maintaining a 4.6 driver rating. 253 Discarding the factors test
allows for less arbitrary judicial classification.
Finally, an elements test does not necessarily lead to rigid application.
The desirability of a factors test lies in the fact that “uncertainty [acts] as the
price of a system that permits treating each case as unique.”254 But the twopronged test that this Comment proposes also allows fluidity between
different fact patterns.255 The proposed elements test, however, offers
246. Harned, et al., supra note 237, at 116 (“Businesses worldwide are experimenting with
flexible work arrangements.”).
247. Id. at 93–94 (“Audits for such misclassifications are becoming more frequent, indicating
that more and more business owners struggle because of [th]e uncertainty in the law.”).
248. Id. at 94.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (AM. LAW INST.1958).
251. Determining Who Is an Employee, supra note 216.
252. See supra Part II.C.1.
253. See supra Part I.A.1. This is especially important because Uber would likely be without
a large portion of their driving fleet if they did not allow their drivers to select their own hours.
254. Carlson, supra note 164, at 336.
255. For example, take a hypothetical new mobile application, Electricians4Hire. The
application puts homeowners with faulty wiring and damaged outlets in touch with electricians. If
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fewer opportunities for judges and juries to impose their own personal
views into the law. 256
III. CONCLUSION
The current methods of determining whether one is an employee or
independent contractor are inconsistent, at best.257 Such inconsistency is
problematic because it leads to unfair and unpredictable results.258 Workers
in the sharing economy are at a particular disadvantage because the nature
of the work often allows people to work according to their own schedule.259
This one factor gives pro-independent contractor courts enough ammunition
to declare that workers, like Uber drivers, are independent contractors. The
reality, however, is that the nature of work is changing, as illustrated by the
sharing economy’s dismantling of the traditional nine-to-five workday. 260
This Comment develops a new employee/independent contractor
classification test that is intended to strike at the heart of what it means to
be one or the other, and stabilize the current employee/independent
contractor backdrop. 261 The test is a two-prong test that first asks whether
the worker has a limited means to improve his economic opportunity
through managerial skill and then asks if the worker’s duties play an
integral role in the business of the purported employer. Uber drivers satisfy
both of these prongs, and should therefore be classified as employees.
This Comment is not intended to be a smear campaign against Uber; in
fact, Uber serves an important role in our economy. Today’s job market
can be challenging for employees who work shifts that vary weekly. Many
employees who lack a set working schedule will have an even greater
difficulty finding extra part-time jobs due to unpredictable hours. Uber
gives people facing this predicament a means to supplement their income.

the app stops there, it appears as though the participating electricians are independent contractors.
The electricians would have to set their own prices, select their own hours, perhaps offer
exceptional customer service to get a five-star review, and even advertise the work they do (“I do
it all, including working with high voltage generators” compared to “I only run wire”). If the app
were to go further, however, and require participating electricians to do a specific type of work
(e.g. “You must be able to work with generators”), or sets the price for the electrician, the
electrician cannot do anything to gain an entrepreneurial advantage. In fact, the only option for
the electrician would be to continue “grinding away”—working on Electricians4Hire’s terms.
Applying the first prong of this test would likely reveal that the first example is an independent
contractor and the latter is an employee.
256. Carlson, supra note 164, at 336 (“Important questions [regarding employee
classification] frequently depend on the tests that can yield different results depending on the
personal views of the judges or jurors.”).
257. See supra Part I.C.
258. See supra Part II.C.3.
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. See supra Part II.B.
261. See supra Part II.C.
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Nevertheless, Uber drivers are limited in what they can do to improve their
income at Uber, bar driving more often, and they also provide a service to
Uber, that but for them, Uber would be inoperable.262 At the end of the day,
Uber drivers operate like employees with the unique perk of choosing their
own schedule.

262. See supra Part II.C.

